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illustrate that it has fulfilled its proclaimed object with mathematical precision. Such a test would promote equality of the sexes and would categorically
reject presumptions based on sex alone. It would demand that compensatory
programs be designed so that the benefited class coincides exactly with the disadvantaged class. Finally, the strict scrutiny test would oversee the elimination
of the abuses and the adverse effects of classes defined on the basis of sex alone.
GREGG DARRow THOMAS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
RIGHT TO ADEQUATE PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENTAN ILLUSORY GUARANTEE FOR THE DANGEROUS PATIENT
Donaldsonv. O'Connor,493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974)
In January 1957, Kenneth Donaldson, plaintiff-appellee, was involuntarily
civilly committed to the Florida State Mental. Hospital. 1 Fourteen years later
he secured his release through a habeas corpus proceeding, 2 claiming a constitutional right to receive treatment or be released.3 Additionally, he alleged
damages resulting from a deprivation of that right and concomitant bad faith
detainment by his attending physicians.4 Guided by the instruction of the
stricter standard of review that will assert equality and permit gender-based compensatory
statutes to stand only if narrowly drawn. 94 S. Ct. at 1737 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1. Donaldson was diagnosed as a "paranoid schizophrenic," 493 F.2d 507, 509 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 171 (1974).
2. The action was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970), which provides: "Every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
3. The original complaint, filed as a class action on behalf of all patients on Donaldson's
ward, sought: damages to plaintiff and the class, habeas corpus relief for the entire class,
and declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the hospital to provide adequate treatment.
Subsequent to Donadson's release and dismissal of the class action by the district court, the
complaint was first amended praying for damages and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement
of Florida's civil commitment statutes. The prayer for injunctive relief was subsequently
abandoned and the action resulted in a complaint for damages only. 493 F.2d at 512.
4. Appellants, against whom judgments were rendered, were Dr. Gumanis, plaintiff's
attending physician from 1959 until 1967, and Dr. O'Connor, plaintiff's attending physician
from 1957 until 1963 and superintendent until his retirement February 1, 1971. Jury verdicts
were also returned in favor of three others: Dr. Francis G. Walls, acting superintendent after
O'Connor's retirement; Dr. Milton J. Hirschberg, who succeeded O'Connor as permanent
superintendent in June 1971; and Emmett S. Roberts, Secretary of the Florida Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services when Donaldson filed his first amended complaint.
493 F.2d at 510 n-2.
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district court judge, which stated that plaintiff had a constitutional right to
treatment,5 the jury returned a verdit for the appellee.6 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and HELD, the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment guarantees a right to treatment to nondangerous
involuntarily civilly committed mental patients.7
Traditionally, laws regarding the mentally ill have reflected the current
state of medical knowledge and sense of community responsibility., Prior to
the evolution of public mental institutions, developed collaterally with the
increasing need for involuntary commitments, 9 the noncriminal- mentally ill
were entrusted to the family or to public guardians." Since concern centered
on the potential danger to the community from the individual, few rights of
the mentally ill were recognized. 12 Changing societal attitudes regarding the
mentally ill, however, were reflected in a Massachusetts case indicating that the
propriety of detention must be determined on an individual basis, balancing
the community's need for safety with the massive encroachment detention
thrusts upon the individual's liberty.' a Following this judicial recognition of
minimum due process rights of an involuntarily committed individual, justifi5. Id. at 518. Florida also has a statutory right to treatment, but it is difficult to determine from the statute the degree of adequate treatment required. The statute merely says:
"Each patient in a facility shall receive treatment suited to his needs, which shall be administered skillfully, safely, and humanely with full respect for his dignity and personal
integrity. Each patient shall receive such medical, vocational, social, educational, and rehabilitative services as his condition requires to bring about an early return to his community." FLA. STAT. §394.459(4)(a) (1973). This provision, however, was not the basis of the
Fifth Circuit's opinion. 493 F.2d at 507.
6. The verdict awarded Donaldson $17,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in
punitive damages against O'Connor; Sli,500 in compensatory damages and S5,000 in punitive damages against Gumanis. 493 F.2d at 513.
7. 493 F.2d at 527. The court was not consistent in its use of the term "nondangerous."
At one point the court said: "We turn now to the novel and important question whether
civilly committed mental patients have a constitutional right to treatment." Id. at 518.
Elsewhere the opinion read: "We hold that a person involuntarily civilly committed to a
state mental hospital has a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will
give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition." Id. at
520. In summary, however, the court held: "[]here a nondangerous patient is involuntarily
civilly committed to a state menial hospital, the only constitutionally permissible purpose of
confinement is to provide treatment, and . . . such a patient has a constitutional right to
such treatment as will help him to be cured or to improve his mental condition." 493 F.2d
at 527 (emphasis added).
F. LINDMAN & D. 'CINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
9. See I B. ENNIS & P. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY
8.

LAW 10

(1961).

38 (1973).
10. See Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. RiEv. 784, 786
(1969), for the contention that a person committed following acquittal by reason of insanity and a criminal developing mental illness while serving his sentence should receive the
same treatment as involuntarily civilly committed individuals.
11. S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 8 (1971).
12. See generally Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures,
79 HARV. L. REv. 1288 (1966).
13. Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122, 125 (Mass. 1845). In conformity with its
recognition of due process standards for the mentally ill, the court indicated that detention
for therapy as well as for the protection of society is justifiable.
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cation for commitment began to reflect an attitude based on the concept of

parens patriae,14 which is characteristically more sensitive to an individual's

well-being. 1 Although community attitudes continued to stress the dangerousness of a mental patient,6 individuals began to be afforded due process rights
regarding notice and a fair hearing, 7 relief from illegal confinement,'8 a right
to counsel, 19 and detention in a more therapeutic atmosphere than a prison
affords.2 0 The right to treatment, however, was not a current issue until a 1960
article21 recommended judicial adoption of that right. -2 The author asserted
that involuntary civil confinement without adequate treatment is similar to
confinement for criminal activity, in the sense that both provide little more
23
than custodial care.
This plea for judicial recognition of a constitutional right to treatment,
however, went unheeded. Following initial statutory establishment of a right
to treatment, 2 courts not only endorsed that statutory right, but hesitantly
14. Parens patriae conceives of the state as the proper guardian to supply treatment,
custody, and care for mentally and physically incapacitated individuals. See Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MiCH. L. REv. 945, 956-60 (1959).
15. Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134, 1140-41 (1967).
16. Concern centered more on fear of the mentally ill regarding community safety than
on the individual's need for treatment and rehabilitation. This fear was indigenous to inadequate knowledge of the mentally insane. F. LiNDMAN & D. McIrva_, supra note 8.
17. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (state civil commitment procedures constitutionally invalid for failing to require, inter alia, effective notice
of charge and right to jury trial); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa.
1971) (statute devoid of due process requirements for commitment is unconstitutional); State
ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinex, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.V.2d 72 (1954) (notice and hearing prior to
commitment required by due process of law).
18. Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845).
19. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
20. See, e.g., Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Commonwealth v.
Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1959); In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470

(1958).
21. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960). For a discussion of the
current law regarding right to treatment, see Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1316-58 (1974).
22. Birnbaum, supra note 21, at 503.

23. Id. at 502. Implicitly passive in nature, custodial care similar to that given a criminal
is insufficient to effect a cure of the mentally ill, whose sickness is not and should not be
considered criminal. Cure or improvement in one's mental condition is accomplished by
adjusting, through affirmative action, an individual's current mental state. Adequate treatment is the logical affirmative action to engender such a change.
24. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Rouse involved a habeas
corpus action challenging the propriety, without treatment, of an involuntary civil commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity, pursuant to D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301
(Supp. V, 1972). The court based its decision that the petitioner was entitled to adequate
treatment on the narrow statutory grounds presented in the 1964 Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill Act, providing: "[A] person hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment. The administrator of each public hospital shall keep records detailing all medical and
psychiatric care and treatment received by a person hospitalized for a mental illness and the
records shall be made available, upon that person's written authorization, to his attorney or
personal physician." D.C. CoDE ANN. §21-562 (1967). Rouse signaled a trend toward estab-
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indicated the possible existence of a constitutional right to treatment.2 5 This
26
trend culminated in the Alabama district court case of Wyatt v. Stickney,
which held for the first time that patients involuntarily civilly committed to
an institution for treatment have a constitutional right to treatment effectuating a realistic opportunity for improvement.27 Three other district courts have
directly addressed this issue. Two have reaffirmed the right to treatment, 28 with
29
another finding to the contrary.
The instant case presented a case of first impression for a United States
Circuit Court of Appeals.30 Reiterating the distinction between commitment
based on a police power rationale and one based on a parens patriae theory,3 '
the court followed the Wyatt rationale in classifying commitment for nondangerous individuals3 2 as a logical exercise of the parens patriae authority of
the state. To adopt, then subsequently abandon this magnanimous theory by
failing to supply treatment. to those deprived of their liberty by involuntary
civil commitment, the court reasoned, vitiates the very fundamentals of due
process. 33 Modern societal theories justifying commitment turn on the need to
lishment of a constitutional right to treatment when the court asserted in dicta that a right
to treatment probably exists on broader constitutional grounds. 373 F.2d at 451, 453, 455.
25. E.g., In re Curry, 452 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (all remanding for a
determination of the adequacy of treatment); Nason v. Superintendent, 353 Mass. 604, 233
N.E.2d 908 (1968) (indicating that confinement without treatment may violate equal protection and due process rights).
26. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
27. Wyatt presented a class action initiated by guardians of patients committed to Bryce
Hospital, Tuscaloosa, Alabama. In determining that inadequate treatment deprived patients
of their constitutional rights, the court withheld judgment, allowing state and hospital officials six months to implement an adequate treatment program. Id. at 785. Upon expiration
of the six-month period, the court, assisted by numerous amici, determined that defendants
had failed to promulgate and implement an adequate treatment program and established
minimum constitutional standards for adequate treatment of the mentally ill. Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
28. One case was factually similar to Wyatt. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686
(N.D. Ill. 1973) (agreeing with Wyatt that a constitutional right to treatment exists for
civilly committed mental patients). The other decision held that civilly committed mentally
(D. Minn.
F. Supp.
retarded individuals have a right to treatment. Welsch v. Likens,
1974).
29. Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972). The
court's decision turned and was ultimately decided, however, on the basis that it was brought
as a class action, since the court was unwilling to prescribe treatment standards equally applicable to all hospitalized, mentally ill individuals. Id. at 1343-44.
30. The Fifth Circuit faced the resolution of prior conflicting views within the circuit.
Compare Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), with Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
31. Three distinct bases for commitment have been recognized: (1) danger to self; (2)
danger to others; (3) need for treatment. The police power rationale encompasses danger to
others, need for treatment is a parens patriae rationale, and danger to self contains aspects
of both rationales. See Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures,
79 HARv. L .REv. 1288 (1966).
32. See note 7 supra.
33. 493 F.2d at 521.
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rehabilitate the mentally ill, enabling them to assume productive roles in society.3 4 Legislation has been enacted nationwide consonant with this objective.35 Confinement, however, involves a considerable curtailment of a person's
liberty, for which due process requires justification.3 6 Allowing the government to retain the authority to confine an individual not criminally punishable requires that the individual receive a benefit sufficient to justify his confinement.3 T Considering the purpose of commitment, the logical quid pro quo

is adequate treatment. Therefore, absent treatment adequate to comport with
the due process requirement that application of state legislation bear a
rational nexus to its intended purpose, involuntary commitment is constitutionally proscribed. 38 Donaldson's rights coupled with the restraint on his
liberty39 override the state's interest in decreasing hospital expenditures by
providing mere custodial care. Consequently, involuntary confinement of the

mentally ill can be justified only by concurrently guaranteeing rehabilitative
treatment.40
However, the court's summary holding that a nondangerous involuntarily
civilly committed patient has a constitutional right to treatment, creates a

dichotomy4" that could effectively permit the state to avoid providing treat-

ment merely by showing that a patient is dangerous.42 Therefore, whether the
court intended to limit the application of the instant case to nondangerous
patients is critical. Interpreting the principal case in light of Wyatt,4 3 future

34. This is reflected in the curent advancement of general standards of treatment and
extra-hospital facilities designed to reintroduce the patient into society gradually and effectively. See Birnbaum, Some Remarks on "The Right to Treatment," 23 ALA. L. REv. 623
(1971).
35. S.BRAK &
&R. Roca, supra note 11, at 66-154.
36. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
37. See Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?,
57 Gao. L. J. 848, 865-70 (1969), for a formulation of the quid pro quo theory applicable to
civil commitment of the mentally ill.
38. "At the least due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment
bear some reasonable relation to the purposes for which the individual is committed."
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an individual acquitted by reason
of insanity may not be detained beyond a reasonable time without initiating civil commitment procedures in lieu of release). In dicta, however, the Court noted that the purpose of
commitment is to aid the individual in obtaining competency through custodial care or
compulsory treatment. Id. at 738. Although the issue has never been directly considered, by
asserting that provision of either custodial care or treatment will satisfy the reasonableness
test of commitment the Court implied that a constitutional right to treatment does not
exist. This follows, since custodial care is substantially insufficient to effect a cure and be
regarded as treatment. See note 23 supra.
39. Paraphrasing the Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972), the
present court noted: "[T]he indisputable fact that civil commitment entails a 'massive curtailment of liberty' in the constitutional sense." 493 F.2d at 520.
40. "The purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment, not punishment." Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
41. See note 7 supra.
42. Donaldson himself was not dangerous. 493 F.2d at 520-21.
43. The Fifth Circuit depended heavily on the reasoning of the Wyatt court regarding
minimally established institution-wide standards of adequate treatment. Therefore, because
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courts could justifiably conclude that the insertion of the term "nondangerous"
is applicable solely to a determination of the appropriateness of release. Thus
interpreted, the dangerous-nondangerous dichotomy would not be a consideration in determining the existence of a right to adequate treatment. Instead,
the dangerousness or nondangerousness of a patient would become relevant
only when applied to a determination of the desirability of release from confinement. The instant court based liability of the defendants primarily on
their numerous refusals to release Donaldson," indicating an alternative due
process requirement of release in the absence of treatment.5 Therefore, conditioning a right to release, rather than a right to treatment, on a dangerousnondangerous determinative is more consistent with the present court's implicit affirmance of Wyatt. Holding otherwise, a dangerous involuntarily civilly
committed mental patient would be accorded a substantially weaker standard
of due process, because of the indefiniteness of his sentence, than an imprisoned criminal.46
Therefore, without treatment, a hospital, like a prison, would serve only
the public's interest in restraining dangerous persons. The state, however, is
not justified in predicating indefinite confinement of the mentally ill merely
upon an individual's dangerousness, since maximum sentences are set for
criminal offenses after which even a dangerous person must be released.47
Clearly then, indeterminate commitment without treatment for persons not
criminally liable is irreconcilable with concepts of fundamental fairness. 41
W'yatt was a class action, implicit in the present court's advocation of judicially established
minimum standards of treatment for all is the inescapable fact that dangerous as well as
nondangerous patients should be entitled to the same minimal level of adequate treatment.
493 F.2d at 519 n.9, 521, 522 n.22, 526.
44. Appellee's argument asserted that affirmance of the trial court order would not create
a constitutional right to treatment. Instead, appellee contended that because Donaldson was
not dangerous, failure to release him in lieu of providing treatment adequate to comport
with the purpose of his commnilment amounted to a violation of due process. Brief for Appellee at 34-35.
45. The principal court held the district court's instructions No. 37 and No. 38 'alid.
Instruction No. 38 read: "The purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment and not
mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not dangerous to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification, from a constitutional standpoint, for continued
confinement." 493 F.2d at 518 (emphasis added).
46. It should also be noted that an imprisoned criminal who is determined mentally ill
may be indefinitely confined, subject to certain due process rights. See Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome Extended: The Treatment of Mentally Ill "Non-Criminal
Criminals" in New York, 18 BUFFALO L. RFv. 393, 394 (1969).
47. That a criminal is dangerous at expiration of his sentence is not relevant to his
release, since he has theoretically expunged his debt to society by serving the required
sentence. If, however, he is considered mentally ill and dangerous when his sentence expires,
a prisoner is entitled to a jury review to determine his sanity before he can be involuntarily
civilly committed beyond his original criminal sentence. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107

(1966).
48. See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), equating confinement of
the ill without treatment with punishment. Because the court stated that confinement without treatment constitutes punishment, if a state does not give adequate treatment the only
other alternative to negative the statement would be to release the patient. However, re-
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Additionally, indeterminate commitment is not justified for the civilly com-

mitted mentally ill on grounds of dangerousness alone, for a dangerous criminally committed patient must be released if his dangerousness is not a result
of this mental deficiency. 49
In consequence of the applicability of the instant holding to nondangerous
patients, determining the factual circumstances ambiguously embraced by the
instant court will require judicial clarification. The Wyatt court labored to

develop minimal standards, which were set forth in a sequal to Wyatt.50 These
standards of the adequacy of treatment applied to all mental patients; no
distinction was drawn in the standards to account for a patient's dangerous
tendencies. 51 Noting the Wyatt court's reasoning, a Georgia court in Burnham
v. Department of Public Health,52 disagreed and held that determining gen53
eral standards of adequate treatment was beyond judicial competence. In
the wake of these contrary decisions the present court's resolution of the issue
is unclear and as a result, highly limited.5 4 A restrictive interpretation of the
principal holding indicates that it implicitly condones the dispensing of mere
custodial care to a dangerous patient, with little hope of rehabilitation substantial enough to warrant a return to the community. The practical effect
would be to expand the discretionary use of police power to maintain control
of the mentally ill. A state would simply be required to demonstrate a patient's
proclivity toward dangerous behavior; an aspect indigenous to the sane as well
as insane. Once shown, a state could legitimately restrain an individual in the

name of public welfare, while withholding treatment necessary to effect a cure
or improvement in the patient's mental condition.
leasing the patient would burden society's economic structure twofold: (1) the individual
would remain substantially unproductive, and therefore (2) society's cost would increase
through simultaneous economic support for the individual and loss of his productivity contribution. Consequently, the only feasible alternative to satisfy Robinson's command and
the public welfare is to provide adequate treatment for a sick person involuntarily civilly
committed. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 566-69 (1968) (dissenting opinion);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675-77 (concurring opinion).
49. Overholser v. O'Bierne, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d
667 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959) (both cases stating that continued
statutory confinement based upon dangerous propensities is warranted only if those
propensities are related to or arise out of abnormal mental condition).
50. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972), setting forth compre-

hensive minimum standards to be implemented pursuant to the court's previous order in
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
51. Because the court permitted a class action, presumably representing some dangerous
patients as well as nondangerous ones, 325 F. Supp. at 781-82, it is logical that the court
would make no distinction between a dangerous and nondangerous patient in setting forth
minimum standards of adequate treatment. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86
(M.D. Ala. 1972).
52. 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
53. Id. at 1343. The court, however, suggested that a determination of adequacy of
treatment on an individual basis could be countenanced. Id.
54. The principal court, however, appeared to concur in the standards set forth in
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972), which required the same de-

gree of treatment for dangerous as well as nondangerous patients. 493 F.2d at 527.
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